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The new Pennsylvania community property statute' contains
nothing indicating a consciousness of geography except in the enacting
clause where the law making function is in the name of the General
Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The Preamble of
the Act speaks of its application to "husbands and wives and their
property subsequent to the effective date of the act." Which husbands
and wives? And what property? These questions must be thought
about and eventually answered by courts. For Pennsylvanians do
acquire goods and chattels outside of the borders of the Commonwealth
and non-Pennsylvanians do come here, make money and with it some-
times buy local land. Among the questions which those advising
clients, trying cases, or deciding lawsuits must eventually face, there-
fore, will be those which determine the applicability of this sleep
disturbing statute to acts which Pennsylvanians do in other states and
those which non-Pennsylvanians do here.
It is not suggested that the Act is defective in failing to answer
in advance the various conflict of laws questions which may arise. Had
that been attempted the statute would have become much more com-
plicated. Furthermore no one, even though he has considerable
familiarity with the subject, can tell in advance what all the questions
are which may arise.
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We may, nonetheless, postulate three propositions. The first is
that the Pennsylvania Legislature was doing in this statute what it
does in the course of its day to day legislative work, that is provide
rules for places and persons over which it has legal authority.
The second postulate is that this law, like others, will be examined
by lawyers and judges with the general principles of conflict of laws
in mind.' Statutes seldom contain conflict of laws provisions. But
courts, in applying them do so with the limitations called for by conflict
of laws rules.
The third postulate is, that inasmuch as the law of community
property has been in force for quite a number of years in several states
of this country,3 the rules of conflict of laws worked out by them in
different situations are in point in discussing the subject in Pennsyl-
vania, although, of course, not binding as authorities upon our courts.
The extent to which this reference to community property law is to be
carried back is a matter not to be determined by any sweeping rule a
priori. Community property had its origin in the Spanish law. But
the study of that origin in Spanish law and developments through
several centuries would seem not to be a very helpful way of finding the
pertinent considerations which should settle a Pennsylvania lawsuit in
1955.' Some background of community property law we shall all
have to acquire.5 But the helpful precedents, it is submitted, will be
those of American courts settling disputes in our day and age regard-
2. They will derive help from the various articles and a few textbooks which
deal with the conflict of laws problems encountered when a state has the community
property regime. See BALLINGER, COMMUNITY PROPERTY (1895); 2 BEALE, CON-
FLICT OF LAWS §§ 237.1-238.2, 289.1-293.2 (1935) ; DAGGETT, THE COMMUNITY PROP-
ERTY SYSTEM IN LOUISIANA (1931); GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS C. IX (2d ed.
1938); McKAY, THE LAW OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY (2d ed. 1925); RESTATEMENT,
CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 237, 289-293 (1934) ; Leflar, Community Property and Conflict
of Laws, 21 CALIF. L. Rav. 221 (1933) ; Neuner, Marital Property and the Conflict
of Laws, 5 LA. L. REv. 167 (1943) ; Harding, Matrimonial Domicil and Marital
Rights in Movables, 30 MICH. L. REv. 859 (1932) ; Stumberg, Marital Property and
the Conflict of Laws, 11 TEx. L. REV. 53 (1932) ; Horowitz, Conflict of Laws Prob-
lems in Community Property, 11 WASH. L. REv. 121, 212 (1936) ; Goodrich, Matri-
inonial Domicile, 27 YALE L. J. 49 (1917) ; Notes, 32 CALIF. L. RXv. 182 (1944) and
43 HARv. L. REV. 1286 (1930).
3. The territories acquired by the United States from the former Spanish pos-
sessions here, recognized community property, and when those territories were given
statehood, they incorporated the community property concept into their property law.
The states of California, Louisiana, New Mexico, and Texas come under this category.
The system was later adopted in Arizona, Idaho, Nevada, Washington, and Oklahoma.
just recently Michigan enacted a community property law which is quite similar to
the Pennsylvania statute.
4. Thus the American jurisdictions will perhaps not follow the civilian notion
that a community property statute is a "statute real" rather than a "statute personal"
and therefore applicable only to things actually situated in the state. Cf. Williams v.
Pope Mfg. Co., 52 La. Ann. 1417, 27 So. 851 (1900) (holding a "real statute" inap-
plicable to cause of action for injuries suffered within the state). But cf. Commis-
sioner v. Skaggs, 122 F. 2d 721 (C. C. A. 5th 1941) ; Smith v. McAtee, 27 Md. 420
(1867).
5. See KEPHART, ORIGIN OF THE CONJUGAL COMMUNITY (1938) ; McKAY, op. cit.
supra note 2, at c. 3.
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ing their present day rules for property interests of husband and wife.'
Here, too, our most helpful precedents will be found in those courts
which are faced with the same problem which we meet in Pennsylvania,
that is the articulation of this community property rule into our com-
mon law and separate property rules which existed before the statute
was passed. The difficulty about this last type of precedent is its
absence, for the problem is as, new to several of our neighbors as it is
to us.
In the following discussion an attempt will be made to put a few
of the common concrete cases of the two state questions arising out of
our new law. The list is not complete. Obviously, the answers can-
not be conclusive. The most the discussion can do is to suggest the
possibilities which the answer could take and to indicate an inclination
for the one which seems to be, on the whole, preferable.
EFFECT OF MARRIAGE UPON OWNERSHIP OF THEN HELD PPOPERTY
The Pennsylvania statute escapes one difficult problem because
it expressly states in the first two sections that property owned by
either spouse prior to marriage is not affected by the Act.' Lest the
authors be accused of making this particular heading of the discussion
like the famous chapter heading: "Snakes in Ireland", let it be added
that the question of the determining law with regard to the effects of
marriage fpon the property of the spouses has caused not a little
litigation and has been the source of not a little confusion. For in-
stance: It is the general conflict of laws rule that the domicil at the
time of marriage determines the interests acquired by each spouse in
the then owned personal property of the other.' What domicil? Some
courts 9 and writers "0 have talked about a "matrimonial domicil".
6. The Pennsylvania Act is, in all its material aspects, identical with the com-
munity property act adopted by the Legislature of Oklahoma. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
32, § 66-82 (Supp. 1946). The Oklahoma law, in turn, is modeled generally on the
law of Texas which has been interpreted by the Texas courts in a number of decisions
for over a century. See TEXAS CIVIL STATUTES §§ 4613-4624 (Vernon, 1925). For
discussions and analyses of some of these earlier laws usually without regard to the
conflict of laws possibilities see Daggett, The Oklahoma Community Property Act, 2
LA. L. REv. 575 (1940) ; De Funiak, A Review i; Brief of Principles of Community
Property, 32 Ky. L. J. 63 (1943) ; Jacob, Law of Commnity Property in Idaho, 1
IDAHO L. REv. 1 (1931).
7. "All property of the husband, both real and personal, omned or claimed by
him before marriage, or before the effective date of this act, whichever is later,
shall be his separate property." Penna. Acts 1947, No. 550, § 1 (July 8, 1947). (Sec-
tion 2 has the same provisions in so far as the wife's property is concerned.)
8. 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 289.1 (1935) ; GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 120 (2d ed. 1938); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 289 (1934). This book
hereinafter will be cited as "RESTATEMENT."
9. Payne v. Commissioner, 141 F. 2d 398 (C. C. A. 5th 1944) ; Jaffrey v. Mc-
Gough, 83 Ala. 202, 3 So. 594 (1888) ; Glenn v. Glenn, 47 Ala. 204 (1872) ; Mason v.
Fuller, 36 Conn. 160 (1869) ; Ford's Curators v. Ford, 2 Mart. (N. s.) 574 (1824);
Hayden v. Nutt, 4 La. Ann. 65 (1849).
10. STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 194 (8th ed. 1883) ; WHARTON, CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 190 (3d ed. 1905).
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Then the question arises whether this matrimonial domicil is that of
the husband at the time the parties are married or whether it may be
some other place to which they may in the future intend to go and set up
their household establishment." However, the notion of a separate
matrimonial domicil in this connection has been pretty well exploded
as it is now exploded in the field of divorce law.'
All this makes interesting learning and no doubt happy litigation
for lawyers. But we may dismiss it so far as the bearing of the Penn-
sylvania Act is concerned. None of the other questions arising under
the Act can be answered so easily.3
EXTRASTATE ACTIVITIES OF PENNSYLVANIANS
Let us start with some concrete cases. Arthur and Barbara are
married and live in Pennsylvania. Arthur practices medicine. On
September 5, 1947, he is called to Wilmington to consult with a Dela-
ware physician. At the conclusion of the conference an operation is
decided upon which Arthur performs. For this he receives a fee of
$5,000 which is paid to him by the patient in Wilmington two weeks
later. If Arthur dies or the community comes to an end by a divorce,
may half of this fee be claimed by Barbara as part of her share in the
11. To Story, matrimonial domicil meant "the domicil of the husband, if the in-
tention of the parties be to fix their residence there; and of the wife, if the intention
is to fix their residence there; and if the residence is intended to be in some other
place, as in New York, then the matrimonial domicil would be in New York." STORY,
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 194 (8th ed. 1883). In all the American cases cited by Story
to establish the definition, the facts reveal that the intended domicil and the domicil
of the husband coincided, so that the result would have been the same if th-e concept
of matrimonial domicil had been rejected. See Harding, Matrimonial Domicil and
Marital Rights in Movables, 30 Micx. L. REv. 859, 865 (1932) ; Goodrich, Matrimo-
nial Domicil, 27 YALE L. J. 49, 58 (1917). Story's definition has been vigorously
criticized by the above two writers. See also Note, Marital Property Rights and the
Conflict of Laws, 43 HARv. L. REv. 1286, 1288 (1930). But cf. COOK, LOGICAL AND LE-
GAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 448 (1942). Professor Cook has substituted the
words "intended family domicil" for "matrimonial domicil," but he proposes that the
same legal consequences be given to the term substituted as Story said should accom-
pany his concept of "matrimonial domicil." Thus his suggestion is open to all of the
criticisms, except the one of meaningless terminology, which were justifiably heaped
upon Story's definition. For these criticisms see Harding, supra at 860.
12. See GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 30 (2d ed. 1938) ; WOLFF, PRIVATE IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 366 (1945) ; Leflar, Community Property and Conflict of Laws,
21 CALIF. L. REv. 221, 222 (1933) ; Stumberg, Marital Property and the Conflict of
Laws, 11 TEx. L. REv. 53, 54-56 (1932).
13. It is safe to predict that the Act will not affect the present result in another'
conflict of laws situation. The statute reads that any property received as compensa-
tion for personal injuries shall remain the injured spouse's separate property. The
wrongdoer will, therefore, be prevented from advancing the argument that the con-
tributory negligence of one spouse should reduce any recovery by one-half since the
guilty spouse will share in the recovery. Vitale v. Checker Cab Co., 166 La. 527, 117
So. 579 (1928) ; cf. Traglio v. Harris, 104 F. 2d 439 (C. C. A. 9th 1939), noted in 28
CALIF. L. REV. 211 (1940) ; Matney v. Blue Ribbon, Inc., 202 La. 505, 12 So. 2d 253
(1943), 5 LA. L. REv. 467. This Act, therefore, should have no effect on tort prob-
lems having a foreign element.
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community? Assume the property law of Delaware, when there is no
problem of conflict of laws, to be that acquisitions by either spouse are
that spouse's separate property.
We need take no time in pointing out that the acts and resolves
of the Pennsylvania Legislature are not operative in Delaware. Nor
need we take many lines of type to indicate that a state has a very
considerable amount of power over persons domiciled therein, even
though they are temporarily absent. 4 But neither of these considera-
tions seems to get us very far. Once upon a time one might have cited
the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam, but nowadays few of us know
enough Latin to be intimidated by it. And it is quite obviously the
physical fact that movables follow the person of the owner only if he
decides to take them with him. The most, therefore, that the maxim
can do is to state a result and we are trying to find reasons.
There are several places in the law where it is the generally
recognized rule that all of an owner's personal property moves as a
unit or whole. That is the conflict of laws rule with regard to acquisi-
tion of interests in the other spouse upon marriage.' Property passes
en masse on bankruptcy."0 And according to the general conflict of
laws rule, personal property is distributed, after the owner's death, in
accordance with his domiciliary law no matter where it lies.Y' In other
words, there are instances where, for considerations of convenience, it
has been thought best to treat all of a man's personal interests as one
block instead of individually by separate pieces.
14. Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U. S. 69 (1941) ; Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457
(1940), 41 COL. L. Rlv. 724 (1941), 29 GEo. L. J. 784, 25 MINN. L. REv. 798; Alaska
Packers Assn v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U. S. 532 (1935) ; cf. Cole v. Cun-
ningham, 133 U. S. 107 (1890) ; Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421 (1932), 32
COL. L. REv. 747, 17 CORN. L. Q. 117, 1 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 132, 2 IDAHO L. REv. 211,
30 MICH. L. Rlv. 137, 30 MICE. L. REv. 968, 17 ST. Louis L. REv. 85, 6 So. CALIF. L.
REv. 60; see Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HARv. L. REv.
1210, 1219-1225 (1946).
15. See 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 289 (1935) ; GOODRIc H, CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 121. (2d ed. 1938) ; RESTATEMENT § 289. Here, however, the rule has ceased to have
much significance because it is generally the law that spouses retain the same interest
in their property after marriage that they had before. See KUHN, COMPARATIVE CoM-
MENTARIES IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 147 (1937). This system, called "sepa-
ration of goods" was adopted in England in 1882. It was taken over from the conti-
nent where it still is in force in Austria, Hungary, Italy, and the Balkan States and
adopted in nearly all common law countries, including most of our states. See WOLFF,
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 362 (1945).
16. The trustee in bankruptcy is vested by operation of law with the title of the
bankrupt to all property, including rights of action, "which prior to the filing of the
petition he could by any means have transferred. . . ." 30 STAT. 566 (1898), 52
STAT. 880 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 110(a) (5) (1940). It is clear that all property in
the United States passes en masse and it is strongly urged that the section applies to
assets located abroad. See Nadelmann, The National Bankruptcy Act and the Con-
flict of Laws, 59 HARV. L. RIv. 1025, 1030 (1946). But a general assignment for
creditors "will not be effective" as to property situated in another state. RESTATEMENT
§264.
17. Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625 (1916) ; 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 301
(1935) ; GOoDRcICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 161 (2d ed. 1938) ; RESTATEMENT § 303.
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Conceivably this acquisition of money or chattels outside the state
by a Pennsylvanian might be subject to the same rule. Intangibles
having no actual location would naturally be governed by the rule
prevailing at the owner's domicil."5 Tangibles may or may not be
brought there, although at a guess one would be justified in asserting
that they probably would eventually get to their owner's home. It
would be convenient to have all of these acquisitions covered by one
rule and to that extent eliminate the difficult accounting problems
which are bound to arise in the assimilation of our new law into our
old system.
With regard to original acquisitions of chattels the law is now
pretty well settled that the rule to be applied is the law of the place
where the chattel was acquired.1" But in the case of the acquisition
of marital property the rule generally applied is that the law of the
domicil of the parties is applicable."0 The reason that it is suggested
that the exception should prevail here, rather than the general rule, is
that this community property law is something more than the acquisi-
tion by a corporation of a new piece of machinery. The community
property rule establishes a matrimonial regime and comes close to that
kind of regulation of the relation of husband and wife which is by
general consent left for the domicil to determine. We have numerous
striking examples of such domiciliary control. Thus we have the
domicil furnishing the forum for and causes for divorce,2' the ultimate
dictator in determining the validity of a marriage, 2 the place where
18. Wrightsman v. Commissioner, 111 F. 2d 227 (C. C. A. 5th 1940); Jones v.
Aetna Ins. Co., 14 Conn. 501 (1842); Birmingham Water Works v. Hume, 121 Ala.
168, 25 So. 806 (1899) ; cf. Williams v. Pope Mfg. Co., 52 La. Ann. 1417, 27 So. 851
(1900); Morson v. Second Nat. Bank of Boston, 306 Mass. 588, 29 N. E. 2d 19
(1940), 54 HARV. L. REV. 331. Even where the intangible has acquired a situs in
fact, under some law other than that of the domicil, the decisions seem to retain the
domiciliary law as controlling. See Harding, supra note 2, at 871.
19. Green v. Van Buskirk, 7 Wall. 139 (U. S. 1868); Cammell v. Sewell, 5 H.
& N. 728 (1860) ; see Carnahan, Tangible Property and the Conflict of Laws, 2 U.
OF CHI. L. REV. 345 (1935) ; Robinson, Conflict of Laws in Contracts of Sale, 16 GEo.
L. J. 387 (1928).
20. Shilkret v. Helvering, 138 F. 2d 925 (App. D. C. 1943) ; Ellington v. Harris,
127 Ga. 85, 56 S. E. 134 (1906) ; Douglas v. Douglas, 22 Idaho 336, 125 Pac. 796 (1912) ;
Succession of Dill, 155 La. 47, 98 So. 752 (1923) ; Edwards v. Edwards, 108 Okla. 93,
233 Pac. 477 (1924) ; Snyder v. Stringer, 116 Wash. 131, 198 Pac. 733 (1921) ; Powell
v. DeBlane, 23 Tex. 66 (1859) ; see GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 121 (2d ed. 1938) ;
RESTATEMENT § 290. Contra: Gooding Milling & Elevator Co. v. Lincoln County
State Bank, 22 Idaho 468, 126 Pac. 772 (1912) ; Kerr v. Urie, 86 Md. 72, 37 At. 789
(1897) ; Smith v. McAtee, 27 Md. 420 (1867) ; see Brown v. Daugherty, 120 Fed. 526
(C. C. D. Mo. 1903).
21. Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, 181 U. S. 179 (1901) ; Bell v. Bell, 181 U. S. 175
(1901). See NUSSBAUM, PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 142 (1943);
CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 360 (2d ed. 1938) ; RESTATEMENT § 110.
22. The general chant is that a marriage if valid where contracted is valid every-
where. Medway v. Needham, 16 Mass. 157 (1819); Thorp v. Thorp, 90 N. Y. 602
(1882). But actually the marriage is declared valid only because the law of the dom-
icil usually makes the reference to the place the marriage ceremony was performed.
Since the domicil is the ultimate dictator it can refuse to make the reference and de-
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custody of children can be awarded,2" and the like. There is strong
argument for treating acquisitions of community property as governed
by the same rule, i. e. the domicil of the parties. Considerations for
the applicability of the domiciliary law have been sufficient to make it
the rule stated in the Restatement as the prevailing one.24 The cases
on which the Restatement conclusion is based are not overwhelming in
support, although they represent the majority. The fact that there
are not more of them is not surprising. It takes a long time to build
up a line of cases on a conflict of laws point and it is only when the
state property laws differ that the choice of law question becomes of
any significance. 5 Possibly, too, the lack of authority in part may be
due to the failure of counsel always to recognize the possibility of a
conflict of laws problem. This is especially true in cases arising more
than forty years ago.
There is no conclusive authority in Pennsylvania on the rule to be
applied in determining what law governs acquisitions of property by a
spouse outside the state.26  The two instances where the matter was
involved presented no real choice of law problem between domicil and
place of acquisition since both were the same." Pennsylvania courts
start writing, therefore, with a clean slate. Unless someone shows
reason to the contrary, we may expect them to follow the Restatement
and the weight of authority upon this point.
An interesting and tantalizing version of our hypothetical case is
presented if we assume Arthur to have his domicil in Ohio and Barbara
clare the marriage valid or invalid depending upon its own law despite the fact that
the place of contracting would have reached the opposite result in a case where no
foreign element was present. In re Takahashi's Estate, 113 Mont. 490, 129 P. 2d 217
(1942) ; cf. Succession of Hernandez, 46 La. Ann. 962, 15 So. 461 (1894) ; see RE-
STATEMENT §§ 121, 131, 132, comment a. The marriage would be invalid even at the
place of contracting. Id. at § 132.
23. Glass v. Glass, 260 Mass. 562, 157 N. E. 621 (1927) ; Pieretti v. Pieretti, 13
N. J. Misc. 98, 176 Atl. 589 (Ch. 1935) ; People ex rel. Winston v. Winston, 31 App.
Div. 121, 52 N. Y. Supp. 814 (1st Dept. 1898) ; Harris v. Harris, 115 N. C. 587, 20
S. E. 187 (1894) ; see RESTATEMENT § 142; Beale, The Status of the Child and the
Conflict of Laws, 1 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 13 (1933).
24. RESTATEMENT § 290.
25. See, e. g., State v. Barrow, 14 Tex. 179 (1855).
26. The Pennsylvania Annotators, however, state that their state is in accord with
the RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS; PA. ANNOT. § 107 (1936).
27. In Bollinger v. Gallagher, 163 Pa. 245, 29 Atl. 751 (1894) H and W were
domiciled in Maryland. W bought H's goods at sheriff's sale in Maryland. Under
the law of Maryland H had to sign note before wife could make a purchase on credit
but the property would be her separate property. H brought the property into Penn-
sylvania and it was attached by his creditors. Held, for W, the title that the wife had
in the property should be determined by the law of Maryland.
In Davis v. Zimmerman, 67 Pa. 70 (1870), H and W were domiciled in West
Virginia. The law of West Virginia was that all property obtained by wife during
coverture immediately became the property of the husband. W purchased a horse in
West Virginia. H brought the horse into Pennsylvania and it was levied upon by
H's creditors. Held, horse belonged to husband and could be seized and sold for his
debts.
It is obvious that in both cases the place of acquisition and the domicil of the
parties were the same.
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to have her domicil in Pennsylvania.2" Does Barbara's Pennsylvania
domicil convert Arthur's Ohio earnings into community property and,
by the same token let him split his income with her on his income tax
form? It is hard to give an authoritative answer to this question,
although it has come up a time or two. In general, courts are inclined
to take "domicil" in this type of situation as meaning the domicil of
the husband.29 Generally he is the earning spouse and it is natural
enough to look to his domiciliary law to determine ownership of what
he makes. However, if the situation is reversed and the wife is earning
the money, or what is more common, each spouse is engaged in gainful
occupation, it could well be that the rule of the domicil of the spouse
the ownership of whose earnings may be in'question should be applied.3"
In our initial case we had Arthur earning a fee by the performance
of the operation in Delaware. Suppose instead of acquiring personalty
in that state he acquires real estate. Is the land thus acquired in Dela-
ware held in community? Section 3 of the Pennsylvania statute,
read literally, would seem to say so.3' And much of the discussion
already set out as to the desirability of one rule to govern all of our
Pennsylvania spouse's acquisitions after September 1, 1947, would
point to a conclusion which made no distinction between real estate
and personal property. There is, nevertheless, another rule so well
established that there seems little chance that the acquisition of Dela-
ware land will be governed as to marital interest by the Pennsylvania
law. That rule is the almost universally recognized one of referring
all questions of interest in land to the law of the place where the land
is." You may call it a relic of feudalism if you will, or you may
justify it on practical grounds by the desirability of having a local
record title tested by reference to local rules of law. 3 Whatever the
28. It is well established in Pennsylvania that a wife under certain circumstances
can acquire a separate domicil as long as it does not make her guilty of desertion.
Colvin v. Reed, 55 Pa. 375 (1867) ; Bishop v. Bishop, 30 Pa. 412 (1858) ; Hollister
v. Hollister, 6 Pa. 449 (1847) ; Commonwealth v. Parker, 59 Pa. Super. 74 (1915).
This is in accord with section 28 of the RESTATEMENT prior to its 1947 amendment.
29: Succession of Dill, 155 La. 47, 98 So. 752 (1923) ; cf. Payne v. Commissioner,
141 F. 2d 398 (C. C. A. 5th 1944).
30. RESTATEMENT § 290, comment c. But cf. Payne v. Commissioner, 141 F. 2d
398 (C. C. A. 5th 1944).
31. "All property acquired by either the husband or wife during marriage and
after the effective date of this act, except that which is the separate property of either,
as hereinabove defined, shall be deemed the community or common property of the
husband and wife and each shall be vested with an undivided one-half interest therein,
and all the effects which the husband and wife possess at the time the marriage may
be dissolved shall be regarded as common effects or gains unless the contrary be satis-
factorily proved." Penna. Acts 1947, No. 550, § 3 (July 8, 1947).
32. See CHESHnR, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 536 (2d ed. 1938) ; GOODICH,
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 144 (2d ed. 1938) ; STUMBERG, PRI cIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
345 (1937) ; RESTATEMENT §§ 214-24, 245-54.
33. Other reasons for the rule that immovables are governed by the law of the
situs are summarized in Neuner, Marital Property and the Conflict of Laws, 5 LA. L.
REv. 167, 168 (1942). For examples of qualifications and limitations of the universal
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reason, the rule is there with little or no indication of its being
weakened.
But to state that the law of the situs determines the nature of one's
interest in land does not tell the whole story in this connection. Sup-
pose that Arthur has taken funds earned after September 1, 1947, and
,with them buys land in Ohio. Assume that by the Ohio law when an
Ohioan purchases land in Ohio and takes title in his own name the
land is his. No doubt a sale by Arthur of this Ohio land would pass
a free and clear title to a bona fide purchaser."' But if the land was
purchased with community funds and no third party rights intervened,
it is pretty clear that Barbara, when the community comes to an end,
can get protection which will enable her to follow her community
interest in the money into the land purchased with the money. There
have been a number of decisions on this point and they have all come
out the same way.35 Perhaps it is nothing more than an application
of the well known doctrine of constructive trust. At least the result
is the same.
If this Ohio land had been purchased, one half with separate
property owned by Arthur and one half with funds of the community,
the question becomes a little more complicated as a mathematical
problem, but the principle of law applicable does not change. Here,
too, our constructive trust analogy provides the extent to which
Barbara as owner of one half of the community interest can pursue that
interest into the land.
36
A more difficult question arises about the income from the land.
Suppose that the foreign realty purchased consists of a piece of land
with a dwelling house thereon. Arthur has bouglt it, has leased it,
reference to the law of the situs, see Goodrich, Two States and Real Estate, 89 U. oF
PA. L. REv. 417 (1941).
34. Cf. Neuner, supra note 33, at 172. The wife must do something in the state
in which the land is located to protect her interest in the land against a bona fide pur-
chaser. Cf. Heirs of Dohan v. Murdock, 41 La. Ann. Rep. 494, 6 So. 131 (1889). If
the husband, however, carried tangible property owned by the community into a com-
mon law state and sold it, a bona fide purchaser would probably not get a good title,
except that power to dispose of community assets may be given by the statute, as in
Section 4 of the Pennsylvania Act. Bank of United States v. Lee, 13 Pet. 107 (U. S.
1839) ; DeLane v. Moore, 14 How. 253 (U. S. 1852) ; O'Neill v. Henderson, 15 Ark.
235 (1854). Cf. Leflar, Community Property and Conflict of Laws, 21 CALIF. L. REv.
221, 235 (1933) ; Note, Marital Property Rights and the Conflict of Laws, 43 HARV.
L. REv. 1286, 1288 (1930). A few continental systems grant protection to the bona
fide purchaser by declaring all foreign matrimonial regimes to be inoperative as against
him unless the spouses have made their property regime publicly known. See WOLFF,
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 369 (1945).
35. Depas v. Mayo, 11 Mo. 314, 49 Am. Dec. 88 (1848) ; Hendricks v. Issacs, 46
Hun. 239, 11 N. Y. St. Rep. 527 (1887) ; cf. Walker v. Marseilles, 70 Miss. 283, 12
So. 211 (1892) ; Edwards v. Edwards, 108 Okla. 93, 233 Pac. 477 (1925) ; see Note,
Community Property, 32 CALIF. L. REv. 182, 186 (1944) ; cf. Parrott, Adm'r. v. Nim-
mo, 28 Ark. 351 (1873). Even if the land were purchased with community funds in
a "separate property" state with the wife's consent the result should be the same. Note,
32 CALIF. L. REv. 182, 187 (1944).
36. Cf. In re Gulstine's Estate, 166 Wash. 325, 6 P. 2d 628 (1932).
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and is now collecting rent. Is the rent community property? We are
assuming, first, that Arthur bought this house with community funds,
but that the title to the premises is in his own name. The answer here
is not difficult, since something analogous to the constructive trust
device would give Barbara protection to her community interest in the
land. The same protection would be afforded to protect her interest
in the income from the land. This result is indicated by the language
in several cases.B
More difficult is the question which arises if Arthur has bought
the land with his separate funds. These may be funds he owned before
September 1, 1947, or they may have come to him since by gift or
inheritance. With these he buys the dwelling house in Ohio and
leases it to a tenant. May he keep the rent? Arguments can be made
to the contrary. The money which is given for rent is not usually
regarded as land and it may well be urged that the general rule with
regard to the domiciliary law controlling interests in personalty should
apply.38 However, it seems to be clear that Arthur's interest in the
rent from the Ohio real estate should not subject him to greater respon-
sibility to the community than he would have if the money came as rent
from Pennsylvania real estate. Now if he had bought Pennsylvania
land with his separate property, there is authority for saying that he
could keep the money which comes from the land as his separate
property. 9  This is an extension of the "source" or "replacement"
37. Cf. Depas v. Mayo, 11 Mo. 314, 49 Am. Dec. 88 (1848); Bonati v. Welsch, 24
N. Y. 157 (1861).
38. Rent is a substitute for the feudal incidents, therefore, it is arguable that the
law of the situs should control. Thus the answer may depend upon a solution of the
problem of characterization. If Ohio regarded the lessor's interest in the rent as land,
would Pennsylvania after noting that fact apply the Ohio rule of separate property?
Cf. Commissioner v. Skaggs, 122 F. 2d 721 (C. C. A. 5th 1941); Richardson v. Neb-
lett, 122 Miss. 723, 84 So. 695 (1920). In McCullum v. Smith, Meigs, 342 (Tenn. 1838)
a person who died domiciled in Tennessee left slaves on a Louisiana plantation; ac-
cording to Louisiana law slaves were considered immovables. The court held that the
slaves passed as immovables under the law of Louisiana. But cf. Williamson's Adm'rs
v. Smart, Taylor 219 (La. 1801). For a reconciliation of these prima facie incon-
sistent cases, see ROBERTSON, CHARACTERIZATION IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 208-209
(1940). It is the law of the state in which the property is situated which determines
the property's character as real or personal, movable or immovable. Duncan v. Law-
son, 41 Ch. D. 394 (1889) ; Young v. Young, 5 La. Ann. Rep. 611 (1850) ; Kneeland
v. Ensley, 19 Tenn. 620 (1838) ; RESTATEMENT § 208. And for some purposes a lease-
hold interest is characterized as an immovable. E. g., Duncan v. Lawson, supra.
39. Robinson's Succession, 23 La. Ann. Rep. 174 (1871) (marital community un-
successfully sought to have the husband's separate estate account for cotton raised on
his separately owned farm in a common law state) ; In re Pepper, 158 Cal. 619, 112
Pac. 62 (1910) ; Spreckels v. Spreckels, 116 Cal. 339, 48 Pac. 228 (1897) ; Lewis v.
Johns, 24 Cal. 98, 85 Am. Dec. 49 (1864). This result is usually reached only if the
Spanish Law has been modified by statute. Commissioner v. Skaggs, 122 F. 2d 721
(C. C. A. 5th 1941). The natural enhancement in value during coverture of separate
property is not property acquired during the marriage so that it falls into the com-
munity. See Conley v. Moe, 7 Wash. 2d 355, 357, 110 P. 2d 172, 175 (1941). The
authorities are not in agreement on how royalties on oil leases from separate prop-
erty should be treated. Stephens v. Stephens, 292 S. W. 290 (Tex. App. 1927)
(separate property) ; Harmon v. Oklahoma Tax Comm., 189 Okla. 475, 118 P. 2d 205
(1941) (community income) ; see 21 TUL. L. REv. 675 (1947).
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doctrine.4" That application as applied to a situation of the kind just
mentioned is none too clear, however. A simple illustration will show
why it is not. Suppose a wealthy Montana mine owner moves to
California. He engages in no further gainful occupation, being content
to bask in the sunshine and be supported by the royalties from his
Montana mines, which under Montana law are his separate property.
Does his wife get any benefit from California communitkr property law
with regard to income which the husband now receives as a Califor-
nian? There is no case which answers this.4  But in the converse
situation a taxpayer's argument that although he was living in a sepa-
rate property state he should be able to split his income because it all
grew out of community property which he had acquired in Texas was
rejected.42
Perhaps we will get some help in the solution by approaching the
question this way: If a state is to have a community property regime
it seems desirable that that regime be accepted, so far as the state's
authority extends, as to all matters not expressly excluded by the
statute. Establishment of community property in Pennsylvania may
have been motivated by a desire to reduce income tax for Pennsylvania
taxpayers. Nevertheless, the statute is not in terms a tax-avoiding
statute,43 but an enactment which sets up 'a method of regulating inter-
ests of spouses in acquisitions during marriage. It ought to be con-
sistently applied, so far as Pennsylvania's jurisdiction extends, to
accomplish that result. There is, therefore, good argument for sup-
porting a conclusion that rent, whether from Pennsylvania land 44
40. The doctrine has also been called the doctrine of "transformation." DAGGETT,
THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY SYsTEm OF LOUISIANA 27 (1931); see Jacobs, Law of
Community Property in Idaho, 1 IDAHO L. J. 37 (1931). When a husband domiciled in
a common law state there acquires money and invests it in land in a jurisdiction where
the community property regime prevails he does not have to share ownership of the
property with the wife. In re Warner's Estate, 167 Cal. 686, 140 Pac. 583 (1914) ;
Ellington v. Harris, 127 Ga. 85, 56 S. E. 134 (1902) ; Clark v. Thayer, 98 Tex. 142,
81 S. W. 1274 (1904) ; Grange v. Kayser, 80 S. W. 2d 1007 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) ;
Blethen v. Bonner, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 585, 71 S. W. 290 (1902); Brookman v. Dur-
kee, 46 Wash. 578, 90 Pac. 914 (1907). This is true even though he has become dom-
iciled in the community property state prior to making the purchase. In re Nicolls,
164 Cal. 368, 129 Pac. 278 (1912) ; In re Burrow's Estate, 136 Cal. 113, 68 Pac. 488
(1902) ; Latterner v. Latterner, 121 Cal. App. 298, 8 P. 2d 870 (1932). The decision
has been the same even where the husband's separate property was acquired under the
common law rule that upon marriage the wife's personal property becomes the hus-
band's. McDaniel v. Harley, 42 S. W. 323 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897). A state may, of
course, provide that the rule be otherwise. See GOOnRIcH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 325,-fn.
5 (2d ed. 1938).
41. See McKAY, COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 655 (2d ed. 1925).
42. Johnson v. Commissioner, 88 F. 2d 952 (C. C. A. 8th 1937).
43. This statute has been approved by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
Philadelphia Legal Intelligencer, Aug. 29, 1947, p. 1, col. 3.
44. There are decisions to the effect that the rents and profits of separate land are
community property. Frame v. Frame, 120 Tex. 61, 36 S. W. 2d 152 (1931) (result
compelled by Texas Constitution) ; Mellie Esperson Stewart, 35 B. T. A. 406, af'd.,
95 F. 2d 821; C. C. Harmon, 1 T. C. 40, af'd., 139 F. 2d 211, rev'd. on other grounds,
323 U. S. 44 (1944). In all of these cases the land was situated in the community
property state and the spouses were also domiciled in the community property state.
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or land anywhere else,45 should be treated as falling into the community
even though the land itself is separate property.
DEBTS
Suppose on September 8, 1947, Barbara went to New York and
there made some purchases. She bought an expensive rug for the living
room, she botight a fur coat for herself, and another for her sister.
If these goods are not paid for, what are the creditor's rights? If the
creditor proceeds against Barbara to what property does he have re-
course? 46 Are community funds liable? It is being assumed, of
course, that New York law knows neither community funds nor com-
munity debts.
These cases present some trouble. A community debt incurred in
one state, of course, may be collected out of community property in
another state. That is clear and easy." But can a debt incurred in
a non-community state by one spouse be enforced against community
assets in Pennsylvania? The subject has been litigated several times
and the majority of the decisions hold that a separate debt cannot be
collected out of community assets, even though, had the obligation been
incurred locally, it would have been considered a community obliga-
tion."
This result is hard on the creditor and, it is submitted, unneces-
sarily so. Note the way the hardship develops. If a New York mer-
chant had sold the coat to Barbara in New York and she had been
domiciled in that state, it is true he would have had a claim only against
45. The all-inclusive language of the Pennsylvania Act together with the consid-
erations above expressed should lead the courts to hold that rents from foreign real
estate, though the land was purchased with separate funds, are community funds. One
writer predicts otherwise. See Lentz, An Analysis of the Basic Income Tax Prob-
lems Arising Under the Law (published by the Philadelphia Legal Intelligencer), p.
11, n. 8. The two cases cited to support this prediction do not compel the conclusion
suggested. Hammond v. Commissioner, 106 F. 2d 420 (C. C. A. 10th 1939) turned
on the fact that the situs of the land characterized an oil lease as an immovable. Thus
the law of the situs was applied. See note 38 supra. The other case involved the
effect of a post-nuptial contract on land in another state. Black v. Commissioner, 114
F. 2d 355 (C. C. A. 9th 1940).
46. Presumably, he could go against any of Barbara's separate property owned
prior to or acquired subsequently to September 1, 1947. Gooding Milling & Elevator
Co. v. Lincoln County State Bank, 22 Idaho 468, 126 Pac. 772 (1912). In that case
the court held, contrary to the view it had previously taken, that the property pur-
chased in the common law state by the wife, while domiciled in a community property
state, was separate property. Cf. Douglas v. Douglas, 22 Idaho 336, 125 Pac. 796
(1912). Once it reached this conclusion, however, it correctly held that the property
was subject to her separate debts.
47. See McKAY, COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 816 (2d ed. 1925) ; cf. Pillatos v. Hyde,
11 Wash. 2d 403, 119 P. 2d 323 (1941).
48. Gibson v. Sublett, 82 Ky. 596, 6 Ky. Law Rep. 645 (1885); Spearman v.
Ward, 114 Pa. 634, 8 Atl. 430 (1887) ; Merrielles v. State Bank of Keokuk, 5 Tex.
Civ. App. 483, 24 S. W. 564 (1893) ; Mountain v. Price, 20 Wash. 2d 129, 146 P. 2d
327 (1944); Meng v. Security State Bank of Woodland, 16 Wash. 2d 215, 133 P. 2d
293 (1943); Huyvaerts v. Roedtz, 105 Wash. 657, 178 Pac. 801 (1919) ; LaSelle v.
Woolery, 14 Wash. 70, 44 Pac. 115 (1896) ; see GooDRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 119
(2d ed. 1938). Contra: Holt v. Empey, 32 Idaho 106, 178 Pac. 703 (1919) ; but see
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Barbara but, at the same time, the coat and other assets which grew out
of money earned by her would have been hers. Subject to New York
exemption laws, the creditor could have seized these assets in satisfac-
tion of a judgment obtained for the price of the coat. But earlier in
this paper it was indicated that the rule with regard to acquisitions of
Pennsylvanians should be that the community rule applies after Septem-
ber 1, 1947, even if the property was acquired out of the state.49 We
assume that Barbara's purchase of this coat would have been a com-
munity acquisition if the purchase had been made in Pennsylvania.
It is a community acquisition, therefore, even though purchased in New
York. Now, if the creditor comes to enforce his claim, it seems
exceedingly unfair to tell him that this coat has become a community
asset but that his claim for its price is an individual claim against
Barbara only and not collectible out of community assets. The Act
probably will avoid this result since the debt was "one contracted by
the wife . . . in the course of acquiring community property ..
But if the coat is destroyed the creditor could not levy on other assets
which the wife had caused to come into the community. This treats
the New York creditor in a harsher fashion than a Pennsylvania
creditor would be treated under the same set of facts. Such treatment
does not raise the faintest odor of a violation of the privileges and
immunities clause, 0 but is unfair, nevertheless.
There is, however, a way out. We grant that Pennsylvania law
does not determine who is bound on the obligation arising out of the
New York transaction,5 but Pennsylvania can, for reasons of fairness,
give a creditor the same relief as if the transaction creating the debt
had occurred in Pennsylvania. This would require some boldness in
establishing a rule in conflict of laws differing from that which other
states have taken.52 But it would not require any fundamental change
Neuner, supra note 33, at 173. Where the debt is the husband's separate debt, how-
ever, some authorities give his creditors the right to collect the debts out of community
property. Vlautin v. Bumpus, 35 Cal. 214 (1868) ; Van Maren v. Johnson, 15 Cal.
308 (1860) ; Tourne v. His Creditors, 6 La. 459 (1833). This result is justified on the
ground that the husband's power and control over the community assets make him the
virtual owner thereof. See McKAY, COMmUNITY PROPERTY §§ 794-797 (2d ed. 1925).
The Pennsylvania courts should reject such a contention. Although the unfairness of
the result in LaSelle v. Woolery, supra, is obviated, the husband is permitted under the
threat of legal process to use the community assets for his sole and separate use. This,
under other circumstances, has been held to constitute a breach of trust. Depas v.
Mayo, 11 Mo. 314, 49 Am. Dec. 88 (1848); Marston v. Rue, 92 Wash. 129, 159 Pac.
111 (1916). The Pennsylvania Act, moreover, does not give the husband such com-
plete control over all the community property that he should be treated as the owner
of these assets.
49. Supra, pp. 6-8.
50. The difference in legal consequence is because of the place where the obliga-
tion occurred rather than the persons involved. Thus if the contracting parties had
been Pennsylvanians but the sale occurred in New York the result would have been the
same. Cf. Douglas v. New York, New Haven R. R. Co., 279 U. S. 377 (1929).
51. RE:STATEMENT § 364.
52. See cases cited supra note 48.
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in conflict of laws principles. All we would be doing here would be to
give the creditor in a foreign transaction the same rights we would
give a creditor had the transaction taken place locally.53  Some sup-
port for this conclusion is found in the language of Section 7 of the
Pennsylvania Act. The last sentence of Section 7 reads as follows:
"All debts created by the husband or wife after marriage, . . . shall be
regarded as community debts, unless the contrary be satisfactorily
proved." Pennsylvania could well "regard" the New York transaction
as creating a community debt. And it could properly refuse to say that
the contrary is proved simply by the showing that under New York
law such a transaction gives rights only against the contracting member
of the community.54
ACTIVITIES OF FOREIGNERS IN PENNSYLVANIA
Charles and Doris are married and are domiciled in New Jersey.
Charles works in Philadelphia. By New Jersey law his earnings are
his separate property at least when there is no foreign element present.
Does the fact that he earns money in Pennsylvania after September 1,
1947 create a community property regime with regard to such earn-
ings ? The problem, of course, depends for its solution upon the proper
construction of the statute. On the basis of what has been said above,
the answer to the question must be no. 5 Like most statutes, the lan-
guage is general and not framed so as to give an explicit answer to
problems in the conflict of laws. But all the arguments which go to say
that outside acquisitions by Pennsylvanians after September 1, 1947,
shall be subject to the community regime go to negative the conclusion
that inside earnings by outsiders after September 1, 1947 shall go into
the community regime. We urge the conclusion, therefore, that per-
sonalty acquired by Charles in Pennsylvania remains his and that
no community regime is set up.56
53. Cf. LaSelle v. Woolery, 11 Wash. 337, 39 Pac. 663 (1895), rezd. on rehear-
ing in 14 Wash. 70, 44 Pac. 115 (1896). But if Pennsylvania would have refused to
permit a levy of attachment if the debt had been ificurred locally, a creditor seeking to
collect a foreign debt, of course, could not attach the local assets. Rube v. Buck, 124
Mo. 178, 27 S. W. 412 (1894).
54. But cf. Thayer v. Clarke, 77 S. W. 1050 (1903), aff'd. 98 Tex. 142, 81 S. W.
1274 (1904), in which the presumption that immovables acquired in a community
property state were community property was rebutted by showing the spouses were
domiciled in a common law state.
55. We here assume that the courts will reject the civilian concept of a "statute
real," note 4 supra.
56. Shilkret v. Helvering, 138 F. 2d 925 (App. D. C. 1943) ; cf. Payne v. Com-
missioner, 141 F. 2d 398 (C. C. A. 5th 1944) ; Williams v. Pope Mfg. Co., 52 La.
Ann. 1417, 27 So. 851 (1900). Such an interpretation will not cause the statute to
be declared unconstitutional as a violation of the privileges and immunities clause of
the Federal Constitution. The rights given by the community property system are
rights attaching by virtue of marriage rather than a privilege. Conner v. Elliott, 18
How. 591 (U. S. 1855). '
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Suppose Charles purchases a house and lot in Pennsylvania after
the effective date of the statute and later decides to sell it. We may get
some complications here. Should a title insurance company insist that
the conveyance be made by members of the community or the Pennsyl-
vania executor of the wife if she has died? After all, Section 3 of the
statute does say that acquisitions subsequent to the effective date of the
Act are to be regarded as community property. We have here the
same problem we had above, when a husband took community property
to a non-community state and bought land." Here, however, the
situation is reversed. Should Charles take separate property from his
non-community state and buy land here in Pennsylvania, a community
state, the land should be treated as remaining his separate property.58
But that he will be able to get a purchaser to accept it as his separate
property without some sort of legal proceedings to establish the fact
that it is so separate is, perhaps, too much to hope.5
CHANGE OF DOMICIL
Outlanders come to live in Pennsylvania and occasionally Penn-
sylvanians go to live elsewhere. These situations, also, can make
some trouble under the community property statute. But, if what
has been said heretofore has been correct, the trouble can be resolved
without undue difficulty.
Suppose Edward and Faith, Pennsylvania husband and wife, have
done so well since September 1, 1947, that they decide to retire and
go to Florida to live. They convert their Pennsylvania land into
money and take their personalty with them. We shall assume that
they have been guided by such competent legal advice that there is no
difficulty in distinguishing, at this point, what is individual property
of husband and wife and what part of the sum total of their assets is
community. They go to Florida, a non-community property state.
Is the nature of the ownership changed or does that which was com-
munity in Pennsylvania remain community when they go to Florida?
Now put the converse case. George and Helen became domiciled
in Pennsylvania in November, 1947. Each owns at the time a fair
amount of property which, by the law of their former domicil, Dela-
57. Supra, pp. 8-9.
58. In re Burrow's Estate, 136 Cal. 113, 68 Pac. 488 (1902) ; Ellington v. Harris,
127 Ga. 85, 56 S. E. 134 (1906) ; Clark v. Thayer, 98 Tex. 142, 81 S. W. 1274 (1904);
Blethen v. Bonner, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 585, 71 S. W. 290 (1902) ; Brookman v. Durkee,
46 Wash. 578, 90 Pac. 914 (1907).
59. If husband and wife buy the property jointly the community property statute
creates no additional problem in protecting the wife since the purchaser would have
notice that the wife has some type of interest in the property. Heirs of Dohan v.
Murdock, 41 La. Ann. 494, 6 So. 131 (1889). Whether the Act makes property pur-
chased jointly by husband and wife community property rather than tenants by the
entirety or joint tenants is obviously not within the scope of this paper. Cf. Note, 32
CALiF. L. IEv. 182 (1944).
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ware, is separately owned. Does that become community property
when they come to Pennslyvania? Let us assume that the property
was acquired by each after September 1, 1947, but before the spouses
came to Pennsylvania to live. The language of Section 3 of the statute
would seem to say that such acquisitions of property were held in the
community regime.6" But such is not the law. The courts have held
with considerable uniformity in this type of case that the nature of
the owner's interest is not changed by his or her acquisition of a domicil
in a state having a different regime.6 Indeed, when California at-
tempted, by statute,62 to provide that the community rule should apply
to all property brought into the state, although acquired under a law
giving separate ownership, the statute was held unconstitutional."
We may say with a fair degree of certainty then, that if Pennsylvanians
leave the state to live elsewhere, the ownership in acquisitions since
September 1, 1947, while they were Pennsylvania domiciliaries, will be
treated as community property elsewhere.64  Likewise, if spouses be-
come domiciled in the state after acquiring property elsewhere, the
existing interests in that property will not be changed by the subsequent
acquisition of a domicil here.65 All of this raises problems in account-
ing, of course. The application of the community property law is
60. "All property acquired by either the husband or wife during. marriage and
after the effective date of this act, except that which is the separate property of either,
as hereinabove defined shall be deemed the community or common property of the hus-
band and wife, and each shall be vested with an undivided one-half interest therein,
and all the effects which the husband and wife possess at the time the marriage may
be dissolved shall be regarded as common effects or gains unless the contrary be satis-
factorily proved." Penna. Acts 1947, No. 550, § 3 (July 8, 1947).
61. Thus, upon a change of domicil, the removal of property acquired while the
spouses were domiciled in a community property state into a separate property state
does not alter the interests of the respective spouse therein. Popp's Succession, 146
La. 464, 83 So. 765 (1919); Packwood's Succession, 9 Rob. 438, 41 Am. Dec. 341
(La. 1845); Depas v. Mayo, 11 Mo. 314, 49 Am. Dec. 88 (1848); Edwards v. Ed-
wards, 108 Okla. 93, 233 Pac. 477 (1924). In the converse situation the interest of
the acquiring spouse is not altered. It re Drishaus' Estate, 199 Cal. 369, 249 Pac. 515
(1926) ; It re Boselly's Estate, 178 Cal. 715, 175 Pac. 4 (1918) ; Latterner v. Lat-
terner, 121 Cal. App. 298, 8 P. 2d 870 (1932) ; Scott v. Remley, 119 Cal. App. 384, 6
P. 2d 536 (1931) ; Douglas v. Douglas, 22 Idaho 336, 125 Pac. 796 (1912) ; Bosma
v. Harder, 94 Ore. 219, 185 Pac. 741 (1919).
62. Until the statute was amended so as specifically to require its application in
the situation in which the property was acquired while the spouses were domiciled
elsewhere the California courts refused so to do. See, e. g., In re Frees' Estate, 187
Cal. 150, 201 Pac. 112 (1921).
63. In re Thornton's Estate, 1 Cal. 2d 1, 33 P. 2d 1, 92 A. L. R. 1343 (1934);
see Brookman v. Durkee, 46 Wash. 578, 583, 90 Pac. 914, 917 (1907). This holding,
however, has been criticized. See Neuner, supra note 33, at 176.
64. See cases cited .sapra note 61.
65. See cases cited supra note 61. The RESTATEMENT § 293, comment b, states
that rights in already acquired property shall remain unaffected by transportation into
a state having a different property system until there is a subsequent transaction con-
cerning the property. The second state determines whether additional property ac-
quired with the proceeds of the property shall retain the character of the proceeds. It
is generally held that a single exchange or investment in the land does not change the
nature of the property rights. Stephen v. Stephen, 36 Ariz. 235, 284 Pac. 158 (1930) ;
Estate of Arms, 186 Cal. 554, 199 Pac. 1053 (1921) ; It re Niccolls, 164 Cal. 368, 129
Pac. 278 (1912) ; Brookman v. Durkee, 46 Wash. 578, 90 Pac. 914 (1907). Contra'
Succession of Packwood, 9 Rob. (La.) 438, 41 Am. Dec. 341 (1845).
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going to create such problems, and they are going to be magnified when
courts are presented with two state instead of one state questions.
There is one further question about George and Helen who came
to Pennsylvania with separate property and are now living and are
domiciled here. There is no doubt about the community property
nature of earnings of either of the spouses here in this state. But what
about the gains made from property which they brought in as the
separate property of each? Do these gains go into the community?
It can be argued, on the one side, that if the tree, that is the fund
which produces the gains, is separate property, then the fruit should be
separate."6 On the other hand, these people have now become domiciled
in Pennsylvania and Pennsylvania is the state which, for reasons of
policy, has adopted the community property regime. Pennsylvania
cannot change the nature of what they acquired before they became
Pennsylvanians, but Pennsylvania can say: "What you do after you
become domiciled here is governed by our marital property rule. Your
acquisitions, therefore, as Pennsylvanians become community prop-
erty." To support this conclusion is in line with the point of view
previously expressed in this discussion.67 It carries out the general
principle of extending the community property regime to the situations
where the Pennsylvania Legislature can constitutionally extend it. If
that is a sound principle the result indicated should follow. Authori-
ties on the subject are not unanimous.6" It must also be borne in mind
that when federal courts are deciding questions concerning the nature
and incidents of federal taxation they are not settling for the state
the question of its local property law.69
CONTRACTS-ANTE-NUPTIAL AND POST-NUPTIAL
May husbands and wives change the nature of marital property
ownership by contract? They certainly can under the law of European
66. In re Frees' Estate, 187 Cal. 150, 201 Pac. 112 (1921) ; cf. Stephens v. Stephens,
292 S. W. 290 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
67. Supra at pp. 6-8, 14.
68. Compare In re Frees' Estate, 187 Cal. 150, 201 Pac. 112 (1921) and Lewis v.
Johns, 24 Cal. 98, 85 Am. Dec. 49 (1864), with Oliver v. Robertson, 41 Tex. 422
(1874) and Stewart v. Commissioner, 95 F. 2d 821 (C. C. A. 5th 1938). Where the
spouse has to contribute time and energy to produce the income from the separate
property the courts more readily hold that such income is community property. See
LeSourd, Community Property Status of Income From Business Involving Personal
Services and Separate Capital, 22 WAsH. L. REV. 19 (1947). In most European coun-
tries the rule is that the law of the husband's first domicil at the time of marriage, or
the law of his nationality where the nationality principle obtains, governs all acquisi-
tions even though the domicil changes. WOLFF, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 366
(1945).
69. State decisions and state property law need be followed only if the Tax Stat-
ute impliedly or explicitly so requires. Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U. S. 78 (1940) ;
Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U. S. 103 (1932). For a discussion of this general problem,
see Cahn, Local Law in Federal Taxation, 52 YALE L. J. 799 (1943) ; Polisher, Disre-
garding the Common Law Concepts in Federal Taxes, 23 TAX MAC. 594 (1945).
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countries, the home of community property rules.7" Indeed, the
English House of Lords went so far as to say that where a man and
wife were married in France without an ante-nuptial agreement that
the provisions of the French law which brought them into the com-
munity property regime became an implied contract which imposed
that regime upon the husband's very substantial earnings after he had
been domiciled in England for many years.71 There are plenty of
criticisms of this absurd result to be found elsewhere and time will not
be taken to go into it here.7 ' American cases have reached the contrary
conclusion."3 One can hardly take seriously an argument that if Irving
and Julia are married in Pennsylvania December 8, 1947, they have
impliedly made a contract for the ownership of their joint acquisitions
for the rest of their lives, regardless of their future migrations. The
fact is that Pennsylvania law will govern them so long as they remain
Pennsylvanians. If they go to Minnesota to live, their future acquisi-
tions will be governed by the rule of their new domicil.' 4
Suppose, however, we have a husband and wife, Karl and Lucy,
who have come to live in Pennsylvania subsequent to September 1,
1947. Each is a successful wage earner and back in Missouri, where
they were formerly domiciled and where they could validly contract,
they made an agreement that each should always keep his or her earn-
ings and their acquisitions as separate property. Some courts have
cautiously said that such contracts, especially ante-nuptial contracts,
would not be applied after the parties had moved to another state,
unless the intent that they should be so applied clearly appeared.75
But, on the facts stipulated here, that intent is clearly shown. Will
such a contract escape the effects of the provisions of the Pennsylvania
law as to marital property? The answer is probably yes. We turn
again to Section 7 of the statute 76 providing for community debts
which ends with the phrase "unless the contrary be satisfactorily
70. See KuHN, COMPARATIVE COMMENTARIES ON PRivATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
151-154 (1937).
71. De Nicols v. Curlier, [1900] A. C. 21; In re De Nicols, [1900] 2 Ch. D. 410;
accord, Beaudoin v. Trudel, [1937] 1 D. L. R. 216.
72. See, e. g., GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 121 (2d ed. 1938).
73. The doctrine of an implied contract was expressly repudiated in Saul v. His
Creditors, 5 Mart. (N. s.) 569 (La. 1827) ; In re Majot, 199 N. Y. 29, 92 N. E. 402
(1910).
74. Birmingham Waterworks Co. v. Hume, 121 Ala. 168, 25 So. 806 (1899); 1;
re Majot's Estate, 199 N. Y. 29, 92 N. E. 402 (1910).
75. Long v. Hess, 154 Ill. 482, 40 N. E. 335 (1895) ; Fuss v. Fuss, 24 Wis. 256
(1869) ; see Note 27 ILL. L. Rxv. 202 (1932). Contra: Kleb v. Kleb, 70 N. J. Eq.
305, 62 Atl. 396 (1905), af'd., 71 N. J. Eq. 787, 65 At. 1118 (1907).
76. ". . . All debts created by the husband or wife after marriage, or after the
effective date of this act, whichever is later, shall be regarded as community debts,
unless the contrary be satisfactorily proved." Penna. Acts 1947, No. 550, § 7 (July 8,
1947).
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proved." Then, again, Section 9 provides for the transfer of com-
munity interests between the spouses." These indications are not con-
clusive. But coupled with the general recognition of the possibility of
contractual modification of the community property rule,78 it does
not seem a violent conclusion that Pennsylvania spouses may, by ap-
propriate action, contract themselves out of the regime if they wish
to do so.T" It seems, likewise, to follow that Pennsylvania courts
would recognize and give effect to a similar contract made by outsiders
if the agreement was valid where made. 0
Ante-nuptial and post-nuptial contracts have not been common in
this country and there is comparatively little litigation concerning them,
in the conflict of laws aspect at any rate. Whether the growth of com-
munity property laws will increase this type of bargaining remains to be
seen. Perhaps that will depend upon whether a favorable situation for
the married taxpayer is dependent upon his subjecting all gains to the
community property rule.
77. "The husband may give, grant, bargain, sell, or convey directly to his wife
and a wife may give, grant, bargain, sell or convey directly to her husband his or her
community property in esse. Every deed and conveyance made from the husband to
the wife, or from the wife to the husband shall operate to divest the property therein
described of every claim or demand as community property to the extent herein pro-
vided, and shall vest the same in the grantee as the separate property of the grantee.
." Penna. Acts 1947, No. 550, § 9 (July 8, 1947).
78. See LEFLAR, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 143 (1938) ; STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS
288 (1937).
79. But a statute which gives the spouses an election to adopt the community
property system runs afoul of the rationale of Earl v. Lucas, 281 U. S. 111 (1930)
and for income tax purposes will not be recognized. Commissioner v. Harmon, 323
U. S. 44 (1944).
80. The contract should be enforced in the absence of a strong opposing policy
of the state of the situs. Black v. Commissioner, 114 F. 2d 355 (C. C. A. 9th 1940),
and cases cited therein; Caruth v. Caruth, 128 Iowa 121, 103 N. W. 103 (1905) ; see 2
BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 238.2 (1935); RESTATEMENT § 238, comment b (land),
comment c (personalty). But cf. BEALE, op. cit. supra at § 290.1 (personalty).
